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We study gender differences in the impacts of competition and subjective feedback, 
using an online game with pop-up texts and graphics as treatments. We define 8 
groups: players see a Top 10 leaderboard or not (competitiveness), and within these, 
they receive no feedback, supportive feedback, rewarding feedback, or "trash talk" 
(feedback type). Based on 5191 participants, we find that competition only increases 
the performance of males. However, when it is combined with supportive feedback, 
the performance of females also increases. This points to individualized feedback as a 
potential tool for decreasing gender gaps in competitive settings such as STEM fields. 
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Egy online játék alapján vizsgáljuk a nemek közötti eltéréseket a felettesi 
kommunikáció elemeinek hatásában. A randomizált kezelések egyszerű szövegek és 
grafikák formájában jelennek meg a játék során. Nyolc csoportot különböztetünk 
meg: a játékosok látnak Top 10 táblát vagy nem (verseny), és, ezeken belül, nem 
kapnak visszajelzést, illetve bíztatást, dícséretet, vagy cukkoló visszajelzést kapnak 
(visszajelzés). 5191 résztvevő adatai alapján azt látjuk, hogy a verseny önmagában 
cask a férfiak teljesítményét javítja, azonban ha a verseny bíztatással párosul, akkor a 
nők teljesítménye is hasonlóan növekszik. Az eredmények a személyre szabott 
visszajelzések fontosságát támasztják alá mint olyan tényező, ami csökkentheti a 
nemek közötti eltéréseket a versenyhelyzetekben, például a STEM szakirányokban. 
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Abstract 
We study gender differences in the impacts of competition and subjective feedback, using an 
online game with pop-up texts and graphics as treatments. We define 8 groups: players see a Top 
10 leaderboard or not (competitiveness), and within these, they receive no feedback, supportive 
feedback, rewarding feedback, or "trash talk" (feedback type). Based on 5191 participants, we find 
that competition only increases the performance of males. However, when it is combined with 
supportive feedback, the performance of females also increases. This points to individualized 
feedback as a potential tool for decreasing gender gaps in competitive settings such as STEM 
fields. 
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1. Introduction  
The economics literature documents significant gender differences in psychological traits and 
preferences (Niederle 2016, Eckel and Grossman 2008; Croson and Gneezy 2009). In particular, 
women tend to compete less1 and perform weaker in competitive situations.2 These competition-
related gender differences have been noted as possible key factors contributing to gender gaps in 
educational (Buser et al 2014, Ors et al 2013) and labor market outcomes (Azmat and Petrongolo 
2014, Bertrand 2011, Joensen and Nielsen 2009). Differences in attitudes towards competition can 
impact outcomes through key decisions, such as field of study and occupation (Buser et al 2014, 
Osborne et al. 2003, Kirkeboen et al. 2016), which contribute significantly to the gender gaps in 
earnings that we still observe today (Bertrand 2020, Macis 2017). Competitive attitudes may also 
impact choices and outcomes within a field, occupation, or workplace. For example, women may 
choose to participate less often in challenging tasks and striving for promotions (Bertrand 2011, 
Kauhanen and Napari 2015), and perform worse in high-stakes, competitive settings (Jurajda and 
Münich 2011, Ors, Palomino and Peyrache 2013).  
Given these documented differences, there is much debate about what can be done to improve the 
performance of females in relatively disadvantageous competitive situations, and thereby decrease 
gender gaps in outcomes. One approach, termed "fix institutions," emphasizes the idea that certain 
institutional elements can be altered to "achieve outcomes that better reflect underlying abilities" 
(Niederle 2016). It is possible that certain elements of the current institutional design – such as 
competitiveness, feedback culture, hiring procedures, or assessment methods - favor males due to 
gender differences in individual traits.3 Previous evidence shows that altering particular elements 
of the institutional design can decrease or even eliminate gender differences in choices and 
outcomes in competitive settings.4 One such element that has received attention is the provision of 
                                                          
1 See Niederle and Vesterlund 2007, Gneezy et al 2009, Niederle and Vesterlund 2011, Healy and Pate 2011, Booth 
and Nolen 2012, and Wozniak et al 2014 for some well-known studies on the topic. 
2 Examples include Gneezy et al 2003, Gneezy and Rustichini 2004, Cai et al. 2019, and Cotton et al 2013. 
3 For example, confidence is frequently studied as a key underlying trait of gender gaps in outcomes. Competition 
may motivate high confidence individuals more, or hurt the performance of lower confidence individuals due to 
increased stress (Azmat et al 2015). Females tend to have lower confidence, even conditional on their ability, 
especially in traditionally male tasks (McCarty 1986, Lloyd et al 2005), and may therefore suffer a relative 
disadvantage in competitive settings. Subjective feedback has been shown to impact those with lower confidence more 
(Chang et al 2012), so it could potentially benefit women and other groups with lower confidence levels. 
4 Several institutional elements, such as single-sex tournaments (Gneezy et al 2003; Datta Gupta et al , 2005), quota-
style affirmative policies (Niederle and Vesterlund 2008; Balafoutas and Sutter 2012), feedback about relative 
performance (Wozniak et al 2011; Wozniak et al. 2014; Ertac, Szentes, 2010; Wozniak et al. 2016), and performance 
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objective feedback (Ertac and Szentes 2010, Azmat and Iriberri 2010, Bandiera, Larcinese, and 
Rasul 2015, Wozniak et al 2016). Nevertheless, in real-life settings, feedback often contains an 
objective as well as a subjective element; thus, we extend the literature by testing the impact of 
subjective feedback. In particular, we study its interaction with competition, to see whether the 
provision of certain types of positive subjective feedback can counteract the disadvantage of 
females in competitive settings.  
We test the impact of subjective content that is given in addition to objective performance feedback 
and contains a positive or negative qualification of past or expected future performance, such as 
praise or encouragement. Subjective feedback has received significant attention in the pedagogy, 
psychology, and human resource management literature (e.g., Deci and Ryan 1985; Locke 1996, 
Posner and Kouzes 1999, Dweck 2007, Johnson 2013, Khan et al. 2014, Wong 2015). Differences 
have been highlighted in the perception and impact by confidence and gender (Chang et al. 2012, 
Healy and Pate 2011; Wozniak et al 2016). However, subjective feedback has not been studied as 
a factor that contributes to gender differences in the education or labor economics literature, or in 
terms of its interaction with competition. We study the impacts of three common types of 
subjective feedback from the previous literature: supportive feedback (encouragement), rewarding 
feedback (praise), and "trash talk." We evaluate whether any of these feedback types can mitigate 
the relative disadvantage of females due to competition. 
To measure the impacts, we analyze a sample of 5191 individuals who played a simple online 
game of visual perception5 that was advertised on social media. During the game, players received 
randomized treatment in the form of simple text and graphics, which appeared as pop-ups on the 
screen before, during, and after the game. Treatment was randomized among a total of eight 
groups, along two dimensions: competitiveness and subjective feedback type. Players either saw 
a leaderboard or did not (competitiveness),6 and, within each of these categories, they received 
either no subjective feedback, supportive feedback, rewarding feedback, or trash talk (feedback 
type). This experimental design allows us to test the impacts of competition and the three feedback 
types when they are given separately, as well as their joint impacts, compared to the control group 
                                                          
feedback followed by sequential choice in entering a tournament (Niederle, Muriel & Yestrumskas, Alexandra 2008) 
have been shown to improve women’s participation in competitive settings. 
5 https://experimental-games.herokuapp.com/. 
6 Competition - in our case, a leaderboard - therefore consists of both relative performance information and public 
acknowledgement of the highest performers.  
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of no leaderboard and no feedback. We estimate treatment effects on various outcome measures 
capturing persistence (number of games played) and performance (accuracy, mean score, best 
score), and assess gender differences in these.  
As a first step, we replicate previous results regarding the unfavorable impact of competition on 
females compared to males,7 and estimate the impacts of the three subjective feedback types 
separately when there is no competition. Next, we analyze how these elements interact. We 
compare how males and females are impacted by competition when there is no subjective 
feedback, versus when competition is coupled with subjective feedback. To our knowledge, there 
is no previous empirical evidence on these interactions, although in real-life settings, these 
elements are present simultaneously. The results point to significant heterogeneity by gender in 
the impacts. While competition increases the persistence of both genders, it only improves the 
performance of males significantly. However, when competition is coupled with supportive 
feedback, the performance of females increases as well, similarly to males. Competition combined 
with supportive feedback increases the performance of both genders and shows no gender gap in 
the overall impact. We acknowledge that these estimates need to be evaluated keeping in mind that 
they may be specific to the task, context, sample, and specific feedback content. Despite this 
caveat, the results do provide evidence of significant heterogeneities in the impact of competition 
and subjective feedback, which can contribute to gender differences in outcomes. Better targeted 
feedback can potentially decrease gender gaps in performance in competitive settings.  
Individualized feedback could be a key factor for decreasing gender gaps in educational and labor 
market outcomes in the future. Subjective feedback is an unavoidable part of everyday supervisory 
communication, and providing more targeted feedback is a relatively low-cost intervention.8 One 
aim of our study is to draw the attention of educators and managers to the importance of 
individualized feedback, as blanket policies such as "tough love" can lead to quantifiable 
performance losses and contribute to inequalities. Furthermore, recent advances - and the COVID-
19 pandemic - have made the use of educational and HR software increasingly widespread. 
                                                          
7 As Niederle (2016) notes, due to the limited external validity of both laboratory and field experiments, it is important 
to confirm the empirical evidence of gender differences in competitiveness in various settings and on various 
populations. 
8 Our study is thus related to recent studies highlighting the impacts of low-cost behavioral interventions in educational 
settings (e.g., Aronson et al 2002, Bettinger et al 2018). For a summary of behavioral nudges in education, see 
Damgaard and Nielsen 2018. 
4 
 
Software developments such as Personalized Tutoring Systems and the use of AI in education 
(Luckin et al 2016, Perotta and Selwyn 2019) allow for the provision of much more frequent 
individualized feedback compared to in-person supervision. Our study does not answer the 
question of what the targeting of feedback should be based on, nor do we suggest that it should be 
based on gender. Research is being carried out to improve targeting algorithms based on highly 
detailed observable data on individual characteristics, behavior, and performance (e.g., Narciss et 





2.1. Experimental Design 
We utilize a simple online game developed for this research, during which players receive 
randomized treatment. The Shape Game (Figure 1) is a simple game of visual perception that 
requires both concentration and effort. The task is to click on a given geometric shape that is 
displayed in the top left corner of the screen (target shape), from the set of shapes that appear on 
the screen. The shapes move around the screen, and players must find and click on all shapes that 
match the target shape shown. The target shape then changes to a new shape. The game takes two 
minutes, and the goal is to score as many points as possible. All players see the remaining game 





Figure 1: Screenshot of the Shape Game  
 
 
Prior to choosing to play, individuals are given a description of the game, and can view a demo 
video as well. The game is preceded by a simple survey (see Appendix Figure A1). This asks for 
basic demographic information: gender, age, country, and level of education. The survey includes 
two further questions related to the individual's own experience with games (plays often, 
sometimes, never), and to their task-related confidence.9 The survey was designed to be quick and 
easy to fill out, asking only for anonymous information similar to what is often requested on 
gaming sites. The survey also asks players to give a nickname, which is used if the player achieves 
a high score in the Top 10 leaderboard. Players are informed of the experimental purpose of the 
game and the details of data collection, but otherwise, the goal was to focus player's attention on 
the game itself, in order to observe real-life behavior in a natural game setting. Additionally, data 
is also collected automatically to account for whether the device the game is played on is a 
touchscreen or not, as well as screen size, both of which may also affect performance. 
                                                          
9 Players are asked how good they consider themselves to be at computer games: excellent, pretty good, ok, pretty 
bad, or very bad. Since the question is asked after the game description, the players’ responses likely reflect their 
beliefs regarding how well they will play this particular game. 
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When players click to start playing the game, they are randomly selected to be in one of the 
treatment groups, as summarized in Table 1. Treatment is varied along two dimensions: whether 
players see a Top 10 leaderboard or not (competitiveness), and in terms of the subjective feedback 
they receive (feedback type). This gives us a total of 8 groups. Seeing a leaderboard or no 
leaderboard is interacted with four types of subjective feedback (including a control with no 
feedback, supportive feedback, praise of performance, and trash talk). This setup allows us to 
estimate the effects of the leaderboard and each of the feedback types individually, as well as their 
joint effects. 
Table 1: Summary of Treatment Groups 
Group Leaderboard Feedback 
1 (Baseline) No None 
2 No Supportive feedback (encouragement) 
3 No Rewarding feedback (praise) 
4 No Trash talk 
5 Yes None 
6 Yes Supportive feedback (encouragement) 
7 Yes Rewarding feedback (praise) 
8 Yes Trash talk 
 
Table 2 summarizes the categories and gives details regarding the specifications and the exact 
timing and feedback content. Subjective feedback was given in the form of text and graphics. As 
our goal was to collect data internationally, we used commonly known English phrases and simple, 
culturally neutral emoticons and pictures in the treatments. Our choice of subjective feedback types 
was motivated by previous evidence on their impact. Supportive feedback, or encouragement, has 
been shown to positively impact females' participation in competitive settings (Unkivoc et al 2016, 
Kahn et al 2014). The phrases in this treatment referred to expressions of support regarding future 
performance ("You can do it!") and acknowledgment of effort ("Great effort!").  
Rewarding feedback, or praise of performance, has been shown to have a less beneficial impact 
on females: studies  suggest that performance-based feedback (praise) may have a negative effect 
on women, and is less beneficial compared to effort-based feedback (Zeldin and Pajares 2000; 
Roberts and Nolen-Hoeksema 1989). On the other hand, such feedback can motivate individuals, 
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and has shown to impact performance as a verbal reward (Ariely 2016). The phrases in the 
rewarding feedback treatment included generally used positive valuations of past performance 
("Good job!").  
Finally, we decided to include a "trash talk" treatment. This was motivated by previous evidence 
on its impact as a motivator (Yip et al 2017), its widespread use in gaming, as well as the feedback 
we received from participants in our pilot experiment (Lovasz et al 2017). Several male testers 
noted that they are motivated by this type of verbal feedback, termed "competitive incivility." This 
treatment included phrases such as "Is that the best you can do?" and "Are you asleep?!", meant to 
capture the spirit of such feedback. However, as our results show, the phrases were likely not 
uncivil and/or humorous enough to motivate those with a preference for this type of 









The Shape Game is freely available on a website.10 Participants were recruited using paid social 
media advertisements, targeted at the age group of 18-45-yearolds, from European countries, 
where we found the response rate to be highest in the pilot experiment. The resulting data sample 
is comprised of 5191 individuals, who played a total of 9557 games. It is important to note that 
different players played a different number of games. During a single gaming session – defined as 
all the games played in a single web browser session – players received the same treatment. A 
small portion of players returned for a second gaming session, but we only included the first 
                                                          






Graphic 1 Graphic 2 Graphic 3 Graphic 4 Graphic 5
Timing Beginning, end Beginning 2nd shape change 5th shape change 8th shape change 10th shape change
1 No None
2 No Supportive feedback
3 No Rewarding feedback
4 No Trash talk
5 Yes None
6 Yes Supportive feedback
7 Yes Rewarding feedback
8 Yes Trash talk
9 
 
session of each player in our sample. This means that randomization took place at the player level, 
and players received the same treatment throughout their observed session. This allows us to study 
longer-run impacts on persistence and performance. 
The data was collected at the event level, meaning we observed every click made by players as 
well as target shape changes and feedback shown. This information on player behavior (clicks) 
and performance (score) is linked to the demographic and other individual information given in 
the survey, and the automatically collected technical data on device type (as well as screen size). 
The event-level data was aggregated to the game level (game total clicks, end score), and to the 
individual player level (number of games played, total score, mean game score, and best game 
score, total clicks, accuracy). We focus our analysis on player level outcomes: number of games 
played as a measure of persistence, and mean game score, as well as best game score and player 
accuracy (score/clicks) as measures of performance in the session. Figure 2 shows the ratio of 
players by game number, as well as the mean score by game number. It shows that only about a 
third of players played a second game, and the ratio of players decreases sharply with game 
number. We can also see a sharp increase in mean score for those who play further after the first 
game, which is in line with learning. 




The descriptive statistics of the estimation sample are presented in Table 3. These show that the 
sample is generally skewed towards younger individuals with higher education. About 55 percent 
of players are aged 24 or below, and about 78-80 percent have secondary or higher level of 
education. The sample consists of only around 27 percent frequent game players, and the majority 
of players consider themselves to be "okay" at playing games (55 percent), only 7 percent consider 
themselves to be excellent. It is likely that serious gamers are less likely to click on an ad for a 
game in their social media feed. The randomization among treatment groups is supported by the 
balanced distribution of characteristics. 
Table 3 also shows that our sample is heavily skewed towards female players, who comprise about 
two thirds of the observations. This suggests a selection bias in our sample. Assuming that the 
social media ads were shown equally to males and females, females were twice as likely to click 
on the ad, fill out the survey, and play the game compared to males. This may be due to the above-
mentioned reason: more males are frequent game players, who could be less likely to try out such 
a simple game, or to try a game based on a social media ad. Another reason for this selection could 
be that there is a gender difference in the willingness to support research activities. As the game 
gives no financial rewards, participation is based on intrinsic motivators, as is usual in the market 
for games. While we cannot say with certainty what the underlying selection mechanisms are, it is 
likely that the sample tends to be under-representative of highly competitive, frequent gamers, 
which impacts the male subsample more than the female subsample. The unbalanced gender 
composition of our sample means that our results are not representative of the entire population, 
which may impact our estimates of the treatment effects. If the most competitive, frequent gamers 
tend to be excluded, we are likely underestimating the impact of competition as a motivator, 





Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the sample 
 Total 
1. 


































N (individuals) 5191 644 688 655 620 652 644 659 629 
N (games) 9557 1110 1167 1114 1037 1310 1312 1372 1135 
Number of games 
played 
1.84 1.72 1.70 1.70 1.67 2.01 2.04 2.08 1.80 
Female 0.70 0.69 0.70 0.69 0.71 0.69 0.71 0.68 0.72 
Age                   
>17 0.25 0.24 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.22 0.26 0.25 
18-24 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.34 0.30 0.27 0.30 
25-34 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.15 0.21 0.19 0.18 
35-44 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.14 
45-64 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 
<65 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 
Education                   
Elementary 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.21 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.20 
Secondary 0.36 0.32 0.36 0.36 0.33 0.41 0.34 0.36 0.37 
College or university 0.46 0.51 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.42 0.48 0.47 0.43 
Plays games often                   
Never 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.21 0.16 0.21 
Sometimes 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.53 0.55 0.55 0.52 0.58 0.53 
Often 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.29 0.25 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.26 
Confidence in game 
playing 
                  
Very bad 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.06 
Pretty bad 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.15 
Ok 0.54 0.55 0.51 0.56 0.53 0.52 0.55 0.54 0.56 
Pretty good 0.18 0.17 0.21 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.17 
Excellent 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.07 
Region          
Hungary 0.46 0.46 0.44 0.46 0.49 0.47 0.45 0.47 0.49 
North America 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Other 0.24 0.24 0.26 0.25 0.23 0.21 0.24 0.24 0.23 
Poland, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia 
0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.17 
Western Europe 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06 




Appendix Table A1 shows the descriptive statistics of the sample by gender. These support that 
randomization was well balanced within gender as well. Figure 3 depicts the distributions of game 
playing frequency and self-reported game playing confidence by gender. The distributions suggest 
that even in our selected sample, males tend to play computer games more often than females, and 
they tend to have higher confidence in their game-playing ability than females. As we will see in 
the next section, the lower confidence of females is not in line with their actual performance, 
suggesting that they tend to undervalue their ability. 
 
Figure 3: Frequency of game playing and self-reported confidence by gender 






b. How good are you at playing computer games? 
 
 
2.3.  Empirical Analysis 
The empirical analysis relies on OLS regressions for the estimation of the various treatment effects. 
We estimate the impact of each treatment compared to the control group, who saw no leaderboard 
and did not receive any subjective feedback. The estimated equations also control for the 
observable characteristics in our data seen in Table 3: the age, country, and education level of the 
individual, whether they are playing on a touchscreen device, and their screen size. Controlling for 
these characteristics should only impact estimates if the sample size is not large enough to 
guarantee the randomness among groups in terms of individual characteristics, or if there is some 
problem with the randomization. The results shown do not differ significantly from treatment 
effects estimated without the control variables, or from simple comparisons of means by group.  
We estimate the effects of the various treatments on player-session level outcomes: score in the 
first game, the number of games the player played in the session, the mean game score, the best 
score they achieved in the session, and accuracy in the session. We use the pooled sample of all 
treatment groups in our estimation. We include dummy variables indicating whether a player saw 
a leaderboard, whether they received one of the subjective feedback types, the player's gender, and 
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the interactions of these as explanatory variables. Including the interaction terms makes it possible 
to estimate the combined effects of competition and feedback and the differential impacts by 
gender. The estimated regressions are of the following form: 
𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖  =  𝛼0  +  𝛼1 ∙ 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖 +   𝛼2 ∙ 𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝛼3 ∙ 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖 ∙ 𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖  + 𝛼4 ∙
𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐹𝐵𝑖  + 𝛼5 ∙ 𝑟𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐹𝐵𝑖  + 𝛼6 ∙ 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑘 𝐹𝐵𝑖 +  𝛼7 ∙ 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐹𝐵𝑖 ∙ 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖  + 𝛼8 ∙
𝑟𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐹𝐵𝑖 ∙ 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖  + 𝛼9 ∙ 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑘 𝐹𝐵𝑖  ∙ 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖  + 𝛼10 ∙ 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐹𝐵𝑖 ∙ 𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖  +
𝛼11 ∙ 𝑟𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐹𝐵𝑖 ∙ 𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖  + 𝛼12 ∙ 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑘 𝐹𝐵𝑖  ∙ 𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖   +  𝛼13 ∙ 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐹𝐵𝑖 ∙ 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖  ∙
𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖  + 𝛼14 ∙ 𝑟𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐹𝐵𝑖 ∙ 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖  ∙ 𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖  + 𝛼15 ∙ 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑘 𝐹𝐵𝑖  ∙ 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖   ∙
𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖  + 𝛼16′𝑋𝑖 + 𝜗𝑖                          (1) 
where outcomei represents the various player-session level outcome variables for individual i, and 
𝑋𝑖 represents control variables (age group, education level, region, touchscreen, screen size). 
The coefficient estimates are then used to calculate the different treatment effects and their 
significance: for the leaderboard when no subjective feedback is given, the effects of the three 
subjective feedback types, and the combined effects of the leaderboard and each subjective 
feedback type. They can also be used to calculate gender differences in the treatment effects and 
in mean outcomes. Table 4 summarizes the calculations based on the linear combinations of the 
coefficient estimates. 
Table 4: Calculation of treatment effects and gender gaps based on the OLS coefficient estimates 
Effect Linear combination of coefficients 
Treatment effect of leaderboard 
with no feedback, males 
leaderboard 
Treatment effect of leaderboard 
with no feedback, females 
leaderboard+female*leaderboard 
Treatment effect of leaderboard 
and feedback, males 
leaderboard+feedback+leaderboard*feedback 
Treatment effect of leaderboard 
and feedback, females 
leaderboard+female*leaderboard+feedback+female*feedback
+leaderboard*feedback+female*leaderboard*feedback 
Gender difference in the treatment 
effect of leaderboard (with no 
feedback) 
female*leaderboard 
Gender difference in the treatment 
effect of leaderboard and feedback 
female*leaderboard+female*feedback+female*leaderboard*f
eedback 
Baseline gender gap in outcomes female 
Gender gap in outcomes with 
leaderboard and no feedback 
female+female*leaderboard 
Gender gap in outcomes with 
leaderboard and feedback 
female+female*leaderboard+female*feedback+female*leader
board*feedback 




2.4 Robustness and Relevance 
We performed several robustness checks to assess the estimation results. We calculated mean 
outcomes for each treatment group by gender, and tested the significance of the differences. We 
estimated the OLS equations with no controls. We estimated the impacts of competition and the 
feedback types on subsamples, rather than pooling all groups.11 Additionally, we estimated the 
effects on subsamples by gender, using the pooled groups specification of equation 1. Estimates 
based on subsamples had lower significance levels due to the smaller sample sizes, but were 
comparable to the main results. We also checked the sensitivity of the results to certain sample 
restrictions: dropping players who clicked less than 3 (or 5) times in the game, and dropping 
observations with extremely high scores (two players achieved scores above 150). Finally, we 
estimated the impact of treatments using the game level dataset, on game level performance (game 
end score). The game level analysis (Appendix Table A4) yielded higher significance due to the 
sample size, but is complicated by the fact that different players play different number of games, 
which is also a potential impact of treatment. In these specifications, we calculate clustered 
standard errors. All checks supported the robustness of the conclusions described here, and are 
available upon request. 
It is important to discuss the relevance of our estimates. The use of an online game represents a 
sort of lab in the field method – as discussed in Gneezy and Imas (2017) - in the sense that it allows 
us to maintain experimental control while observing real life behavior in a natural setting. 
Although this is not a labor market setting, the results reflect the impact on individual behavior 
when facing a new task. Gaining a deeper understanding of such behavior is important, because 
attitudes towards new challenges have been shown to be key lifelong determinants of educational 
achievement (Henderson and Dweck 1991; Hong et al. 1999), and to impact gender differences in 
career choices and outcomes (Lloyd, Walsh, and Yailagh 2005; Dweck 2006).  
Several aspects of the task environment and experimental design are key to the interpretation and 
external relevance of the results. First, we observe changes in behavior in the short-run, based on 
short-term interactions. These short-term estimation results cannot be directly extended to longer-
                                                          
11 For example, subsamples containing two groups for the impact of the leaderboard (Group 1 and Group 5), the impact 
of supportive feedback (Group 1 and Group 2), or the joint impact of leaderboard and supportive feedback (Group 1 
and Group 6). We also tested subsamples with four groups, for example, the impact of a leaderboard and supportive 
feedback based on Groups 1, 2, 5, and 6. 
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term interactions. For example, it is possible that in the longer run, the supportive feedback given 
becomes routine, loses its credibility, and thus becomes less effective. On the other hand, it could 
be that in the longer-run, such feedback may help build a stronger relationship with the supervisor, 
and thus become more important and effective.   
Second, the source of the subjective feedback in the game is clearly pre-programmed, not a real-
life supervisor. It is therefore not given by someone whose opinion may be important to individuals 
and their success. Players play the game within their homes, anonymously. In general, the stakes 
of effort (playing) and performance are relatively low. The time and energy costs of playing are 
minor, just 2 minutes of clicking. There are no financial rewards or prizes. These factors may 
influence both the perception of the feedback and its effect. Individual reactions would likely differ 
in the case of more tailored, personal feedback received from a real-life supervisor, as the stakes 
would be higher: it is more important to impress a supervisor than to perform well in an anonymous 
online environment.  
Third, the results are also likely to be task-specific. The game is a relatively fun task, rather than a 
tedious one. However, it is also somewhat difficult and it requires concentration. We chose such a 
task because our goal was to measure differences in reactions to feedback when individuals are 
faced with a somewhat challenging task, where confidence and performance expectations are 
likely to play a role. The effects are likely to be very different in a setting where the tedious or 
unpleasant nature of the task leads to lower effort, rather than a lack of confidence. Online gaming 
in general, and visual perception in particular, are often considered to be stereotypically male tasks. 
Gender differences in effort and performance are generally smaller in tasks perceived as 
stereotypically more female (Niederle 2016).  
Fourth, as mentioned earlier, the sampling method used – online advertising - is also likely to 
impact the results. Out of the potential pool of those who saw the ad for the game, the sample of 
players is comprised of those who chose to play. As we saw, our sample has a heavily skewed 
gender distribution, suggesting different selection mechanisms by gender. This is important to 
keep in mind throughout the analysis. Arechar et al. (2017) discuss the benefits and problems of 
online experiments,12 and conclude that data collected from these can be reliable and provide the 
                                                          
12 The authors discuss the available evidence and carry out a well-known experiment using both a laboratory setting 
and the online labor market platform Amazon Mechanical Turk. They find that basic behavioral patterns are replicable 
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basis for valuable contributions to the empirical evidence. They also highlight the potential 
selection bias due to participant dropouts as the most important issue. This is a potential limitation 
on the external relevance of our results: the behavior of individuals who are obligated to take part 
in a task, and their reaction to subjective feedback, may be different. However, other methods of 
data collection, such as incentivized laboratory experiments, are also subject to the selection of 
individuals who are willing to participate. 
Finally, our results may be specific to the given subjective content (phrases, graphics, etc.) in the 
experiment. The goal of this study is not to provide specific suggestions for subjective content. It 
is rather to highlight the heterogeneity in its impact, and the importance of this heterogeneity as a 
potential contributor to gender inequalities in outcomes. We suggest that supervisory 
communication should be more individualized, rather than argue for the uniform or gender-
targeted provision of any particular subjective content. These implications are less dependent on 
the external relevance of our specific estimates, but are rather supported by the evidence of 
heterogeneity in the impacts. 
 
3. Results 
In this section, we first look at persistence and performance outcomes by gender in the baseline 
case. We then look at the estimated treatment effects of seeing a leaderboard or receiving one of 
the three subjective feedback types. Next, we look at the combined treatment effects of seeing a 
leaderboard and receiving one of the feedback types. Finally, we discuss the overall implications 
regarding gender differences in outcomes under various treatment schemes. We present simple 
figures depicting mean outcomes and/or treatment effect estimates, where the significance of the 
estimates is indicated by shading. The full OLS results - corresponding to the estimations of 
equation 1 with the various outcome measures as the dependent variables - can be seen in Appendix 
Table A3.  
 
3.1. Baseline Outcomes and Gender Gaps 
                                                          




We first assess the various outcomes by gender in the baseline case, where players see no 
leaderboard, and do not receive any subjective feedback (Group 1). Figure 4 depicts the mean 
outcomes by gender and the gender difference in each outcome, for the players' first game score, 
number of games played in the session, mean score in the session, best score in the session, and 
accuracy (score/clicks) in the session. We can see that in the baseline group, female players have 
similar persistence (number of games played), but better performance, indicated by higher scores 
in the first game and session, and better accuracy.  
The performance advantage of females is likely related to selection into our sample, as discussed 
earlier. If a higher ratio of males in the population are serious (high ability) gamers compared to 
females, and serious gamers are less likely to play such a game, this could lead to the higher mean 
female scores we observe in our sample. It is also possible that the males in our sample are simply 
not motivated to play as well when leaderboard is not shown, while females are more motivated. 
As there is no previous evidence suggesting that males have lower ability in this type of task 
(Shaquiri et al 2016), the gender gap observed in favor of females is likely reflective of one of 




Figure 4: Mean outcomes by gender, baseline group 
 
Notes: 95% confidence intervals are shown for the gender gaps. Detailed information on the coefficients can be found 
in Tables A2 and A3.  
 
3.2. The Impact of Competition 
Given the baseline performance advantage of female players, we next estimate the impact of 
competition when there is no subjective feedback given. The estimated treatment effects are shown 
in Figure 5 and are calculated as the mean performance difference between the treatment 
(leaderboard, no feedback) and no treatment (no leaderboard, no feedback) groups. The results 
suggest that both genders increase the number of games they play - their persistence - when they 
see a leaderboard at the beginning and end of each game, by about 0.3-0.45 games (significant at 
the 5%). Though the increase is higher for males, there is no significant difference in the impact 
by gender. The performance measures, on the other hand, indicate clear gender differences in the 
response to competition. Males' performance increases in the first game in terms of score and 
accuracy:  their mean scores and best scores improve by about 5-7 points. This is a significant 
magnitude: compared to the baseline mean score of around 26, it represents a positive impact of 
around 19-27 percent. Females' performance, on the other hand, does not increase as a result of 
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being shown a leaderboard. Even though they play more games, their accuracy and scores do not 
benefit from competition. The results are in line with previous evidence pointing to the 
performance disadvantage of females in competitive settings, though the difference in the impact 
on persistence is not significant in our experiment.  
Figure 5: Treatment Effects of Competition (Leaderboard) with no Subjective Feedback 
 
Notes: 95% confidence intervals are shown for the treatment effect estimates and the gender gaps in the treatment 
effects. Detailed information on the coefficients can be found in Tables A2 and A3. 
 
3.3. The Effects of Subjective Feedback Types and Competition 
Appendix Figure A2 shows the treatment effects of the three subjective feedback types when there 
is no competition. Overall, the three feedback types have small or zero impacts on persistence and 
performance when given in a setting without competition. None of the feedback types impact the 
number of games played. The estimates of the impact of supportive feedback on performance of 
both males and females are positive, but insignificant. Rewarding feedback (praise) seems to have 
the strongest effect among the three feedback types. It has a positive impact on the performance 
of both genders, though it is stronger for males. However, the effects are only significant for the 
first game score. Trash talk has the least impact of all. The purpose of this feedback treatment was 
to mimic the competitive incivility often seen in online gaming, which can engender competitive 
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motivation (Yip 2017). Our finding of no impact does not provide evidence of the lack of this 
mechanism, it is likely due to our particular specifications, which were not believable or 
motivational enough. The inclusion of trash talk does provide a robustness check, showing that the 
specific content of the subjective feedback treatments matter.  
Next, we turn our attention to our main question. Given the disadvantage of females in the 
competitive setting, can better outcomes be achieved if competition is paired with subjective 
feedback? Appendix Figure A3 shows the combined impacts of seeing a leaderboard and receiving 
subjective feedback on the full set of outcomes, separately for the three subjective feedback types. 
Figures 6 and 7 focus on two outcomes representing persistence and performance, and compare 
the effects of the various combined treatments to the treatment with only a leaderboard.  
We can see that seeing a leaderboard has a positive impact on persistence in general. For males, 
the positive impact is the highest and most significant when rewarding feedback is given in 
addition to the leaderboard. The effect is smaller and less significant when the leaderboard is 
combined with supportive feedback. For females, the impact is somewhat smaller in magnitude, 
and more stable across feedback types. Adding trash talk to the leaderboard appears to decrease 
the beneficial impact on persistence for both genders. Overall, the treatment scheme that achieves 
the most beneficial impact on persistence is the combination of a leaderboard and rewarding 
feedback for male players, while for females, any treatment scheme with a leaderboard increases 
persistence, with the exception of the scheme where it is paired with trash talk. The gender gaps 





Figure 6: Treatment effects on persistence by gender 
 
Notes: Persistence is measured as the number of games played by the player in the session. 95% confidence intervals 
are shown for the treatment effect estimates and the gender gaps in the treatment effects. “FB” refers to feedback. 
Detailed information on the coefficients can be found in Tables A2 and A3. 
 
Figure 7 illustrates the treatment effects on performance (best score) separately for males and 
females. The results indicate significant gender differences in treatment effects by gender. Male 
players generally respond positively to seeing a leaderboard. They achieve higher scores in all 
treatments, with the exception of the treatment combining the leaderboard with trash talk. Adding 
trash talk appears to counteract the beneficial impact of competition. For female players, as we 
saw earlier, seeing a leaderboard does not in itself increase performance. However, the combined 
impact of a leaderboard and supportive feedback is positive and significant at the 5 percent level. 
The effect when the leaderboard is paired with rewarding feedback is positive but insignificant, 
while the combined treatment with trash talk has no impact. The figure also shows that the 
treatment with only a leaderboard has a significantly different impact by gender, favoring males, 





Figure 7: Treatment effects on performance (best score) by gender 
 
Notes: Performance is measured by the best score achieved by the player in the session. 95% confidence intervals are 
shown for the treatment effect estimates and the gender gaps in the treatment effects. “FB” refers to feedback. Detailed 
information on the coefficients can be found in Tables A2 and A3. 
 
Finally, we assess the levels of performance by gender for each treatment group in Figure 8, by 
looking at the means of the best session scores and the gender gap in these. We can see the 
previously documented performance advantage of female players in the baseline group. This 
advantage disappears when competition is added, due to the fact that the mean score of males 
increases, while that of females does not. The combined treatment of a leaderboard and supportive 
feedback, on the other hand, increases the mean scores of both males and females compared to the 
baseline group. We again see a gender performance gap in favor of females as a result. When 
competition is combined with rewarding feedback, females' performance does not increase much 
compared to the baseline, therefore, their performance advantage decreases to close to zero. The 
combined treatment with trash talk decreases mean scores (insignificantly), and preserves the 





Figure 8: Performance levels (best score) by gender and treatment group 
 
Notes: 95% confidence intervals are shown for the treatment effect estimates and the gender gaps in the treatment 
effects. “FB” refers to feedback. Detailed information on the coefficients can be found in Tables A2 and A3. 
 
The results imply that there are important heterogeneities in the impacts of competition, subjective 
feedback types, and their combinations by gender. The magnitudes of the treatment effects and 
their gender differences are far from negligible. For example, the treatments with the most 
beneficial impacts by gender can improve scores by 6.5 for males (leaderboard alone or 
leaderboard combined with rewarding feedback) and 3.5 for females (leaderboard combined with 
supportive feedback), representing increases of about 24 percent and 11 percent over the baseline 
scores, respectively. In terms of gender gaps in outcomes, the baseline advantage of females is 
around 18 percent, which decreases to zero when a leaderboard is shown, but no subjective 
feedback is given. Whatever the reasons behind the baseline performance advantage of females, 
the best overall performance outcomes are achieved with different treatment schemes for males 
and for females. Male players can be motivated by competition alone, and this motivation 
translates to higher persistence and performance. Female players appear to be motivated by 
competition as well, increasing their persistence. However, they only increase their performance 
when supportive feedback is provided at the same time. This means that the parallel provision of 




In this experiment, we show that (1) the subjective content of supervisory feedback is an important 
factor for performance, (2) the impacts of competition and subjective feedback elements are 
interdependent, and (3) there are significant heterogeneities in the impacts by gender. Males 
generally respond positively to competition in the form of a public leaderboard, increasing their 
persistence and performance. Females, on the other hand, do not experience similar gains in 
performance, unless the leaderboard is combined with supportive feedback. The best outcomes are 
achieved under different feedback schemes for males and females. The scheme that has the most 
beneficial impact overall is that of competition combined with supportive feedback. However, the 
main implication of our findings is not that this scheme should be used uniformly, or that feedback 
should be targeted by gender. We argue that the results highlight the importance of individualized 
feedback as a potential tool for decreasing existing gender gaps in competitive settings. 
The effects of competition and feedback are likely dependent on individual characteristics, such 
as confidence, as well as the task and its context. The gender differences in our results can be due 
to underlying differences in such characteristics. Further research is needed to better determine 
what feedback is best suited for different individuals, i.e., how feedback should be targeted. 
However, supervisors – teachers and managers – should be made aware of the performance gains 
they can achieve if they implement more individualized feedback policies. The future 
developments of personalized learning software and HR software may enable better targeting 
mechanisms and the more frequent provision of such feedback. These changes could potentially 
decrease gender gaps in competitive settings, and lead to lower inequality in high-paying STEM 
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Notes: 95% confidence intervals are shown for the treatment effect estimates and the gender gaps in the treatment 








Notes: 95% confidence intervals are shown for the treatment effect estimates and the gender gaps in the treatment 
effects. “FB” refers to feedback. Detailed information on the coefficients can be found in Tables A2 and A3.  
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Table A1: Descriptive statistics of the sample by gender 
























N (individuals) 5191 644 688 655 620 652 644 659 629 
N (games) 9557 1110 1167 1114 1037 1310 1312 1372 1135 
Female 1.84 1.72 1.70 1.70 1.67 2.01 2.04 2.08 1.80 
Male 
N (individuals) 1556 201 206 201 178 202 185 210 173 
N (games) 2544 293 296 300 251 380 322 415 287 
Number of 
games/player 
1.635 1.46 1.44 1.49 1.41 1.88 1.74 1.98 1.66 
Age                   
>17 0.31 0.29 0.30 0.33 0.31 0.35 0.28 0.32 0.31 
18-24 0.30 0.35 0.31 0.30 0.28 0.31 0.34 0.27 0.27 
25-34 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.12 0.16 0.13 0.16 0.17 0.17 
35-44 0.10 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.10 
45-64 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.12 
<65 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.02 
Education                   
Elementary 0.20 0.18 0.23 0.18 0.26 0.19 0.20 0.17 0.19 
Secondary 0.36 0.32 0.32 0.38 0.31 0.43 0.36 0.39 0.41 
College or 
university 
0.43 0.50 0.45 0.44 0.43 0.38 0.44 0.44 0.40 
Plays games                   
Never 0.14 0.10 0.17 0.17 0.12 0.12 0.16 0.12 0.14 
Sometimes 0.46 0.49 0.41 0.37 0.54 0.45 0.44 0.51 0.50 
Often 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.46 0.33 0.43 0.39 0.36 0.36 
Confidence in 
game playing 
                  
Very bad 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.02 
Pretty bad 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.05 0.13 
Ok 0.47 0.54 0.40 0.44 0.48 0.48 0.51 0.48 0.46 
Pretty good 0.25 0.21 0.29 0.26 0.24 0.27 0.22 0.28 0.26 
Excellent 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.17 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.12 
Region          
Hungary 0.37 0.39 0.32 0.34 0.39 0.42 0.36 0.38 0.40 
North America 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 






0.21 0.22 0.19 0.21 0.19 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.21 
Western 
Europe 
0.06 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.07 
Touchscreen 0.62 0.61 0.61 0.64 0.66 0.64 0.62 0.62 0.57 
Female 
N (individuals) 3635 443 482 454 442 450 459 449 456 
N (games) 7013 817 871 814 786 930 990 957 848 
Number of 
games/player 
1.929 1.84 1.81 1.79 1.78 2.07 2.16 2.13 1.86 
Age                   
>17 0.23 0.22 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.20 0.22 0.22 
18-24 0.30 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.31 0.35 0.28 0.27 0.31 
25-34 0.19 0.20 0.17 0.21 0.19 0.16 0.23 0.20 0.19 
35-44 0.15 0.18 0.16 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.15 
45-64 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 
<65 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Education                   
Elementary 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.21 
Secondary 0.35 0.33 0.37 0.36 0.34 0.40 0.34 0.35 0.36 
College or 
university 
0.47 0.52 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.44 0.49 0.49 0.44 
Plays games                   
Never 0.20 0.22 0.19 0.18 0.22 0.19 0.22 0.18 0.23 
Sometimes 0.58 0.58 0.62 0.60 0.56 0.59 0.56 0.61 0.54 
Often 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.23 
Confidence in 
game playing 
                  
Very bad 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.07 
Pretty bad 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.18 0.19 0.15 0.18 0.15 
Ok 0.56 0.55 0.56 0.61 0.55 0.53 0.57 0.56 0.59 
Pretty good 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.14 
Excellent 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 
Region          
Hungary 0.50 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.48 0.51 0.52 
North America 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 




0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.15 
Western 
Europe 
0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06 
Touchscreen 0.72 0.71 0.70 0.74 0.72 0.75 0.71 0.74 0.73 
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Table A2: Full OLS results, pooled groups 














female 4.225 0.284 4.308 4.89 0.0667 
 (1.772) (0.181) (1.800) (2.062) (0.0246) 
leaderboard 4.659 0.46 5.475 6.826 0.0661 
 (2.068) (0.212) (2.102) (2.407) (0.0287) 
supportive FB 2.666 -0.0160 2.579 2.872 0.0241 
 (2.059) (0.211) (2.092) (2.396) (0.0286) 
rewarding FB 4.488 0.0603 3.928* 3.674 0.0458 
 (2.071) (0.212) (2.104) (2.410) (0.0287) 
trash talk 1.903 -0.0188 0.386 0.493 0.0173 
 (2.137) (0.219) (2.172) (2.487) (0.0297) 
leaderboard x supportive FB -3.742 -0.165 -4.100 -4.592 -0.0550 
 (2.948) (0.302) (2.996) (3.431) (0.0409) 
leaderboard x rewarding FB -4.972 0.00693 -4.888 -3.720 -0.0467 
 (2.912) (0.298) (2.959) (3.389) (0.0404) 
leaderboard x trash talk FB -6.568 -0.255 -6.288 -7.182 -0.0931 
 (3.031) (0.310) (3.080) (3.528) (0.0421) 
female x leaderboard -4.406 -0.170 -5.265 -5.916 -0.0656 
 (2.491) (0.255) (2.531) (2.899) (0.0346) 
female x supportive FB -0.531 0.0183 -0.365 -0.461 -0.00291 
 (2.471) (0.253) (2.511) (2.876) (0.0343) 
female x rewarding FB -1.289 -0.0688 -1.344 -0.608 -0.00687 
 (2.493) (0.255) (2.533) (2.901) (0.0346) 
female x trash talk FB -1.029 -0.00613 0.0496 0.431 0.00159 
 (2.552) (0.261) (2.593) (2.969) (0.0354) 
female x leaderboard x supportive FB 3.529 0.195 4.074 4.474 0.0693 
 (3.529) (0.361) (3.586) (4.107) (0.0490) 
female x leaderboard x rewarding FB 3.043 0.0172 3.640 2.245 0.0337 
 (3.510) (0.359) (3.566) (4.085) (0.0487) 
female x leaderboard x trash talk FB 5.207 0.0503 4.865 5.058 0.0547 
 (3.610) (0.369) (3.668) (4.201) (0.0501) 
age group 1 0.475 -0.467 -0.363 -1.140 -0.0741 
 (1.117) (0.114) (1.135) (1.300) (0.0155) 
age group 2 7.947 -0.27 7.386 7.795 0.0165 
 (1.046) (0.107) (1.062) (1.217) (0.0145) 
age group 3 8.077 -0.00320 8.247 8.935 0.05 
 (1.113) (0.114) (1.131) (1.296) (0.0155) 
age group 4 3.791 0.3 4.335 5.246 0.0352 
 (1.181) (0.121) (1.200) (1.374) (0.0164) 
age group 6 -1.933 -0.309 -2.668 -3.260 -0.0817 
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 (2.075) (0.212) (2.109) (2.415) (0.0288) 
high school 0.943 0.113 0.946 1.279 0.0236 
 (0.867) (0.0887) (0.881) (1.009) (0.0120) 
university 4.523 0.33 4.499 5.457 0.0851 
 (0.900) (0.0920) (0.914) (1.047) (0.0125) 
region 1 -3.428 0.200 -3.08 -3.189 -0.106 
 (1.300) (0.133) (1.320) (1.512) (0.0180) 
region 3 -6.991 -0.0755 -7.137 -8.105 -0.158 
 (1.356) (0.139) (1.378) (1.579) (0.0188) 
region 4 -4.293 0.0952 -4.207 -4.362 -0.158 
 (1.425) (0.146) (1.448) (1.658) (0.0198) 
region 5 -3.731 -0.210 -4.305 -5.82 -0.11 
 (1.658) (0.170) (1.684) (1.929) (0.0230) 
touchscreen 11.98 0.423 12.08 13.48 0.241 
 (1.459) (0.149) (1.482) (1.697) (0.0202) 
pixel ratio 1 7.11 0.0307 7.602 7.692 0.221 
 (2.666) (0.273) (2.708) (3.102) (0.0370) 
pixel ratio 2 5.442 0.128 5.611 6.181 0.204 
 (2.262) (0.231) (2.298) (2.633) (0.0314) 
pixel ratio 3 8.377 0.281 8.517 10.12 0.162 
 (2.265) (0.232) (2.301) (2.635) (0.0314) 
Constant 8.468 1.119 10.29 11.58 0.216 
  (3.138) (0.321) (3.189) (3.652) (0.0436) 
Observations 5,190 5,190 5,190 5,190 5,190 






Table A3: Full linear combination estimates, pooled groups 
 
 
Linear combination of coefficients
label estimate p estimate p estimate p estimate p estimate p
female 4.225 0.017 0.284 0.117 4.890 0.018 4.308 0.017 0.067 0.007
leaderboard+fe_leaderboard 0.253 0.855 0.290 0.041 0.911 0.573 0.211 0.881 0.000 0.982
leaderboard 4.659 0.024 0.460 0.030 6.826 0.005 5.475 0.009 0.066 0.021
suppFB+fe_suppFB 2.135 0.118 0.002 0.987 2.412 0.129 2.214 0.111 0.021 0.263
suppFB 2.666 0.195 -0.016 0.939 2.872 0.231 2.579 0.218 0.024 0.398
leaderboard+fe_leaderboard+suppFB+fe_suppFB+lead
erboard_suppFB+fe_leaderboard_suppFB 2.176 0.115 0.322 0.023 3.204 0.046 2.398 0.088 0.036 0.061
leaderboard+suppFB+leaderboard_suppFB 3.584 0.090 0.280 0.196 5.106 0.038 3.954 0.066 0.035 0.230
suppFB+leaderboard_suppFB+fe_suppFB+fe_leaderboa
rd_suppFB 1.923 0.163 0.032 0.819 2.294 0.153 2.188 0.118 0.036 0.063
suppFB+leaderboard_suppFB -1.076 0.611 -0.181 0.403 -1.720 0.484 -1.521 0.479 -0.031 0.293
leaderboard+leaderboard_suppFB+fe_leaderboard+fe_
leaderboard_suppFB 0.041 0.976 0.320 0.021 0.792 0.615 0.185 0.893 0.015 0.434
leaderboard+leaderboard_suppFB 0.918 0.662 0.296 0.169 2.234 0.361 1.375 0.520 0.011 0.704
fe_leaderboard -4.406 0.077 -0.170 0.504 -5.916 0.041 -5.265 0.038 -0.066 0.058
fe_suppFB -0.531 0.830 0.018 0.942 -0.461 0.873 -0.365 0.884 -0.003 0.932
fe_leaderboard+fe_suppFB+fe_leaderboard_suppFB -1.408 0.577 0.043 0.868 -1.902 0.518 -1.556 0.545 0.001 0.983
fe_leaderboard+fe_leaderboard_suppFB -0.877 0.726 0.025 0.924 -1.441 0.620 -1.190 0.639 0.004 0.917
fe_suppFB+fe_leaderboard_suppFB 2.998 0.234 0.213 0.409 4.014 0.171 3.709 0.148 0.066 0.058
female+fe_leaderboard+fe_suppFB+fe_leaderboard_su
ppFB 2.817 0.120 0.327 0.078 2.988 0.157 2.753 0.135 0.067 0.007
female+fe_leaderboard -0.181 0.918 0.114 0.528 -1.026 0.617 -0.956 0.593 0.001 0.964
female+fe_suppFB 3.694 0.033 0.302 0.088 4.429 0.028 3.943 0.025 0.064 0.008
rewFB+fe_rewFB 3.199 0.021 -0.009 0.952 3.066 0.057 2.584 0.067 0.039 0.043
rewFB 4.488 0.030 0.060 0.776 3.674 0.127 3.928 0.062 0.046 0.111
leaderboard+fe_leaderboard+rewFB+fe_rewFB+leader
board_rewFB+fe_leaderboard_rewFB 1.524 0.273 0.306 0.031 2.501 0.122 1.547 0.273 0.026 0.171
leaderboard+rewFB+leaderboard_rewFB 4.176 0.042 0.528 0.012 6.780 0.005 4.516 0.030 0.065 0.022
rewFB+leaderboard_rewFB+fe_rewFB+fe_leaderboard
_rewFB 1.270 0.359 0.016 0.912 1.591 0.324 1.336 0.342 0.026 0.177
rewFB+leaderboard_rewFB -0.484 0.813 0.067 0.748 -0.046 0.985 -0.959 0.645 -0.001 0.976
leaderboard+leaderboard_rewFB+fe_leaderboard+fe_l
eaderboard_rewFB -1.676 0.225 0.314 0.026 -0.564 0.725 -1.037 0.460 -0.013 0.514
leaderboard+leaderboard_rewFB -0.312 0.879 0.467 0.026 3.106 0.193 0.588 0.778 0.019 0.495
fe_rewFB -1.289 0.605 -0.069 0.787 -0.608 0.834 -1.344 0.596 -0.007 0.843
fe_leaderboard+fe_rewFB+fe_leaderboard_rewFB -2.652 0.285 -0.222 0.382 -4.279 0.138 -2.969 0.238 -0.039 0.259
fe_leaderboard+fe_leaderboard_rewFB -1.363 0.581 -0.153 0.545 -3.671 0.202 -1.625 0.518 -0.032 0.352
fe_rewFB+fe_leaderboard_rewFB 1.754 0.478 -0.052 0.838 1.637 0.569 2.296 0.361 0.027 0.434
female+fe_leaderboard+fe_rewFB+fe_leaderboard_re
wFB 1.573 0.368 0.062 0.728 0.611 0.764 1.340 0.450 0.028 0.249
female+fe_rewFB 2.936 0.096 0.215 0.234 4.282 0.037 2.964 0.098 0.060 0.015
trFB+fe_trFB 0.873 0.531 -0.025 0.861 0.924 0.569 0.436 0.759 0.019 0.328
trFB 1.903 0.373 -0.019 0.932 0.493 0.843 0.386 0.859 0.017 0.559
leaderboard+fe_leaderboard+trFB+fe_trFB+leaderboar
d_trFB+fe_leaderboard_trFB -0.235 0.865 0.060 0.671 -0.289 0.857 -0.777 0.581 -0.019 0.324
leaderboard+trFB+leaderboard_trFB -0.006 0.998 0.186 0.398 0.137 0.956 -0.427 0.845 -0.010 0.746
trFB+leaderboard_trFB+fe_trFB+fe_leaderboard_trFB -0.488 0.723 -0.230 0.103 -1.200 0.455 -0.987 0.481 -0.019 0.311
trFB+leaderboard_trFB -4.666 0.030 -0.274 0.213 -6.689 0.008 -5.902 0.007 -0.076 0.011
leaderboard+leaderboard_trFB+fe_leaderboard+fe_lea
derboard_trFB -1.108 0.424 0.085 0.548 -1.214 0.451 -1.212 0.389 -0.038 0.049
leaderboard+leaderboard_trFB -1.909 0.390 0.205 0.366 -0.356 0.890 -0.813 0.718 -0.027 0.381
fe_trFB -1.029 0.687 -0.006 0.981 0.431 0.885 0.050 0.985 0.002 0.964
fe_leaderboard+fe_trFB+fe_leaderboard_trFB -0.228 0.929 -0.126 0.630 -0.427 0.886 -0.350 0.893 -0.009 0.793
fe_leaderboard+fe_leaderboard_trFB 0.801 0.759 -0.120 0.654 -0.858 0.778 -0.399 0.881 -0.011 0.764
fe_trFB+fe_leaderboard_trFB 4.178 0.102 0.044 0.866 5.489 0.065 4.915 0.058 0.056 0.112
female+fe_leaderboard+fe_trFB+fe_leaderboard_trFB 3.996 0.032 0.158 0.407 4.463 0.039 3.959 0.036 0.057 0.026
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Table A4: Game level OLS results: summary of treatment effects 
 
Notes: Estimated treatment effects are presented, based on OLS regressions of the same form as equation (1), 
calculated as shown in Table 4.  along with p-values. First game score results estimated using game level data from 
only the first game played by each individual, with the end of game score as the outcome measure. Pooled games 
results estimated on game level data consisting of all the games played by each individual, with the end of game 
score as the outcome measure, with estimated standard errors clustered at the player level. 
estimate p estimate p estimate p estimate p estimate p estimate p
LB with no FB females 0.401 0.773 1.852 0.089 1.959 0.076 0.337 0.758 0.190 0.861 0.268 0.807
LB with no FB males 4.900 0.018 7.289 0.000 7.350 0.000 5.742 0.000 5.471 0.001 5.558 0.001
FB with no LB females 2.197 0.107 0.577 0.609 -0.334 0.772 2.275 0.034 2.606 0.016 0.499 0.650
FB with no LB males 2.789 0.175 4.022 0.030 -0.430 0.828 2.677 0.099 4.006 0.013 0.535 0.751
LB+FB females 2.199 0.111 1.601 0.138 0.473 0.677 2.364 0.030 1.486 0.171 -0.716 0.512
LB+FB males 3.652 0.084 7.627 0.000 3.062 0.108 4.045 0.015 4.586 0.004 -0.351 0.836
gender diff LB with noFB -4.499 0.071 -5.437 0.009 -5.391 0.010 -5.405 0.006 -5.281 0.007 -5.290 0.007
gender diff FB with noLB -0.592 0.811 -3.445 0.112 0.096 0.967 -0.402 0.836 -1.400 0.473 -0.036 0.986
gender diff LB+FB -1.453 0.565 -6.026 0.003 -2.589 0.243 -1.682 0.398 -3.099 0.110 -0.366 0.856
First game score Game end score, pooled games
Supportive FB Rewarding FB Trash talk Supportive FB Rewarding FB Trash talk
